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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. May Brownfields Redevelopment Associates of New
Union (BRANU) receive restitution under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
§ 7002 from New Union Roofing and Drywall
(NURD) for its disposal of the listed hazardous
substance "roof acid" on the property which BRANU
purchased from NURD?
II. May BRANU recover cleanup costs under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act § 107 from
NURD for NURD's disposal of the listed
hazardous substance "roof acid" on the property
which BRANU purchased from NURD?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Appellants, Brownfields Redevelopment Associates of
New Union (BRANU) and the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) have appealed the decision of the
district court on the issue of liability for the cost of hazardous
waste clean up.
In 1993, BRANU and EPA filed separate suits against
New Union Roofing and Drywall (NURD) in the United
States District Court for the District of New Union. BRANU,
under § 7002 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) and § 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), sought
$200,000 compensation, while EPA, under
§ 107 of CERCLA, sought $100,000 compensation. By mu-
tual consent, the two cases were consolidated, and EPA par-
ticipated in the RCRA issues as an amicus for the defendant,
NURD.
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS
NURD, owned by Andrew Petersen, is a small, locally-
owned and operated construction company. It does not ad-
vertise, but gets new business through referrals from former
customers. NURD has worked solely in Moll's Gardens, a
residential area of Cathertown, New Union. (R. at 1). NURD
purchases its supplies, most made locally except for the roof
acid dry ingredients which are manufactured in Virginia, at
local stores. NURD bought its truck, built in Michigan, from
a local dealership. (R. at 4). The supplies which NURD uses
1996] 855
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in its business are sold to a national market with prices set
competitively by the manufacturers. (R. at 4).
BRANU, owned by Elizabeth Kates, is an environmen-
tally-sensitive company which purchases former commercial
sites in New Union, performs environmental remediation to
attract new development, and then sells the sites. (R. at 2).
In 1990, BRANU purchased a site in Moll's Gardens from
NURD. (Nov. 3, 1995 Pace Letter at 1). NURD owned and
used the site for its business operations from 1981 to 1983.
(R. at 2). Unknown to BRANU at the time of purchase, (R. at
3), NURD had contaminated the site with "roof acid" which
NURD dumped onto the ground on 20 to 30 different occa-
sions from 1981 to 1983. (R. at 2).
Roof acid is manufactured in Virginia and sold in pow-
dered form to hardware stores such as the one in Cathertown
where NURD purchases it. (R. at 4). The dry roof acid is re-
constituted with water for use in removing old shingles from
rooftops. Although made entirely from natural ingredients,
when mixed with water, roof acid is a technical grade listed
hazardous waste under RCRA and has been so listed since
December 31, 1980. (R. at 2). RCRA is implemented by EPA
in New Union, since New Union lacks delegation of authority.
(R. at 2).
NURD mixed the roof acid on site in drums, combining
the dry ingredients with water. (R. at 2). Because its use fell
below threshold levels, NURD was not required to obtain any
permit or regulatory approval to use the roof acid. (R. at 3.)
When some roof acid remained after a roofing job, NURD re-
turned the excess to the Moll's Garden site, mixed it with
fruit juices and soft drinks, then disposed of it in an on-site
compost pit. (R. at 2). The compost pit, located at the rear of
NURD's site, was the only source of contamination on the
site. (R. at 3).
The contamination was discovered when BRANU began
clearing a shed from the property in 1990 in preparation for
applying for a building permit. Through an anonymous
phone call from one of BRANU's neighbors, the EPA regional
office learned that NURD had mixed its excess roof acid with
fruit juices and soft drinks, then disposed of the mixture in
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/30
MOOT COURT
the compost pit. NURD's President admitted this practice.
(R. at 3).
Later in 1990, EPA spent $100,000 to sample and ana-
lyze the soil and groundwater on BRANU's site. (R. at 3).
The sampling results showed that the "soil ... is sufficiently
contaminated with roof acid to constitute a danger should the
site be used as residential property or other land use in which
soil contact by individuals is likely." (R. at 3). BRANU
remediated the site in 1993, spending $200,000. (R. at 3). Af-
terward, BRANU constructed a house on the site in which a
family now lives. (R. at 3).
Later in 1993, BRANU filed suit, under RCRA § 7002
and CERCLA § 107, contending that NURD is responsible to
BRANU for restitution under RCRA § 7002 or, in the alterna-
tive, cost recovery under CERCLA § 107. As the EPA had
also filed suit under CERCLA § 107, the two suits were con-
solidated with the EPA participating as amicus for NURD on
the RCRA issue.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court correctly ruled that Congress was
within its Commerce Clause authority in enacting RCRA
based on a congressional finding in RCRA § 1002(a)(4), codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. 6901(a)(4) that "problems of waste disposal"
"have become a matter national in scope." In interpreting the
statute in such a manner, the district court has determined
congressional intent in an area where Congress had the
power to regulate under the Commerce Clause, and did so.
Express statutory language clearly indicates that Congress
desired to regulate waste disposal rather than leave this mat-
ter to the states. Furthermore, RCRA applies to activities
such as those NURD engaged in, where local economic activi-
ties substantially affect interstate commerce by virtue of
their cumulative effect.
The district court determined that in enacting RCRA
§ 7002, Congress did not create a private cause of action for
restitution even though the court acknowledged RCRA § 7003
authorizes restitution when sought by the EPA. When con-
1996] 857
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sidering whether a statute provides for a specific remedy, a
court must look to the plain language of the statute as well as
its legislative history. BRANU is permitted to obtain restitu-
tion for remediating the contamination at the site it bought
from NURD because the plain language of the RCRA § 7002,
which provides for relief other than injunction, and unambig-
uous legislative history, which requires sections 7002 and
7003 to be read in the same way on both issues of liability
and relief.
The district court should not have excused NURD from
liability under CERCLA § 107(a) because roof acid, a listed
hazardous waste under RCRA regulations, was a hazardous
substance according to CERCLA 101(14). In making this de-
termination, the court misapplied the continuing jurisdiction
principle and the contained-in rule. Furthermore, the
repromulgated mixture rule should have been retroactively
applied to NURD's 1981-1983 disposals. Therefore, NURD is
liable to BRANU for response costs under CERCLA § 107(a).
ARGUMENT I
I. BRANU SHOULD RECEIVE RESTITUTION UNDER
RCRA § 7002 FROM NURD FOR NURD'S
DISPOSAL OF THE LISTED HAZARDOUS
SUBSTANCE "ROOF ACID" ON THE FORMER
NURD PROPERTY WHICH BRANU PURCHASED.
A. The trial court's decision is reviewable de novo.
"For purposes of standard of review, decisions by judges
are traditionally divided into three categories, denominated
questions of law (reviewable de novo), questions of fact (re-
viewable for clear error), and matters of discretion (review-
able for "abuse of discretion")." Pierce v. Underwood, 487
U.S. 552, 558 (1988). The trial court's decision concerning
the NURD's liability under RCRA (and CERCLA) was based
on statutory interpretation and consideration of case law. (R.
at 4-5). Its holding was based on questions of law and the
standard of appellate review, therefore, is de novo.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/30
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B. The plain language of RCRA supports that Congress
acted constitutionally under authority of the
Commerce Clause in enacting RCRA to address
nationwide problems of waste disposal.
"In attempting to discern the intent of Congress in enact-
ing a particular statutory section, [the court] must examine
the language of the statute and, if there is ambiguity, the pol-
icy behind it. The starting point is always the plain meaning
of the words used." Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 713 F.
Supp. 1484, 1488 (1989). If the statute is clear and unambig-
uous "that is the end of the matter; for the court ... must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984).
"The Constitution and the laws of the United States...
shall be the supreme law of the land." U.S. Const. art. VI,
§ 2. Under the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3,
Congress shall have power "[t]o regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations, and among the several States, and with the In-
dian Tribes." "Congress [may] legislatively control[] an
activity because it finds that the activity affects interstate
commerce." Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclama-
tion Assoc., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 277 (1981).
Here, the district court properly deferred to Congress' ex-
press findings, set out in the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act itself, about the effects of waste disposal on
interstate commerce. Congress specifically found in RCRA
§ 1002(a)(1), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(1), that the man-
ufacturing, packaging and marketing of consumer products
leads to generating and discarding an increasing amount of
waste. In RCRA § 1002(a)(3), codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 6901(a)(3), Congress also found that solid waste disposal
necessitated by industrial and commercial activities located
in metropolitan and urban areas poses serious technical and
financial problems to populations concentrated in these ar-
eas. Finally, Congress recognized that, while collecting and
disposing of solid wastes is a State and local responsibility,
waste disposal had become a national matter requiring Con-
1996] 859
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gressional attention. RCRA § 1002(a)(4), codified at 42
U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4). Thus, Congress explained in the statute
the nexus between commercial activity and the ensuing gen-
eration and disposal of solid waste, expressly and rationally
concluding that commercial activities and the resulting need
for waste disposal affect interstate commerce. Plenary con-
gressional authority under the Commerce Clause, therefore,
was invoked properly in enacting RCRA. United States v.
Rogers, 685 F.Supp. 201, 203 (1987).
C. RCRA applies to the instant case since local economic
activities which have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce may be regulated under the Commerce
Clause.
"Where economic activity substantially affects interstate
commerce, legislation regulating that activity [under author-
ity of the Commerce Clause] will be sustained." United
States v. Lopez, U.S. , 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1630, 131 L.Ed.2d
626 (1995). Thus, Lopez sets forth a two-pronged test; the ac-
tivity must be "economic" in nature and it must "substan-
tially affect" interstate commerce. NURD's activities, which
involve the buying and selling of goods and services, are
clearly economic. In accordance with Congress' findings ex-
pressly stated in RCRA, supra, NURD's construction activi-
ties, though confined to the Moll's Gardens neighborhood, (R.
at 1), generate wastes which contribute to the national waste
disposal problem. In determining whether a local activity
will substantially affect interstate commerce, "a court must
consider, not the effect of an individual act... , but rather the
cumulative effect of all similar instances." Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at
1658 (Breyer, J., dissenting). "That [one's] own contribution
... may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove [one] from
the scope of federal regulation where ... [one's] contribution,
taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is
far from trivial." Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-128
(1942) (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123
(1942)). NURD's waste disposal is but a small part of a much
larger national problem.
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MOOT COURT
Furthermore, NURD's activities, though many are car-
ried on locally, substantially affect interstate commerce.
Although its immediate suppliers are located in New Union,
NURD directly takes advantage of the channels of interstate
commerce; its roof acid is shipped from a point of manufac-
ture in Virginia and its truck from Michigan. (R. at 4). More-
over, even though NURD buys its other supplies locally, these
supplies are sold to a national market with prices set com-
petitively by their manufacturers. (R. at 4). NURD's sub-
stantial effects on interstate commerce also extend to: 1)
enabling NURD's employees to obtain goods and services
from out-of-state through the purchasing power of their
paychecks, and 2) allowing NURD's suppliers and manufac-
turers' to do likewise for their employees through profits
earned in part by NURD's purchases. (R. at 4-5). Thus,
where the activity being regulated is clearly commercial or
economic, Congress may regulate that activity, when it be-
longs to a class that, in the aggregate, substantially affects
interstate commerce. NURD's commercial and economic ac-
tivities are sufficient for RCRA to apply to the contamination
caused by its method of waste disposal.
D. The case law and legislative history of RCRA § 7002
supports BRANU's argument that it is entitled to
restitution for cleaning contamination caused by
NURD's dumping of hazardous wastes.
The District Court incorrectly found that BRANU was
not entitled to restitution from NURD under RCRA
§ 7002(a)(1)(B), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (1988).
That section allows any person to commence a civil suit
against "any person,... including any past generator ... or
past... owner or operator of a disposal facility,... who has
contributed to the past disposal of any solid or hazardous
waste which may present an imminent and substantial en-
dangerment to health or the environment." 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(1)(B) (1988). The parties agree that NURD falls
within the specified criteria enunciated above and that until
BRANU remediated the site, it presented an imminent and
substantial endangerment. (R. at 4).
8611996]
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The courts have clearly determined the possible remedies
available to a party pursuant to this statute are injunction
and attorney's fees. What is still ambiguous is whether the
statute provides for restitution, the costs incurred by a party
in abating the imminent and substantial endangerment cre-
ated by the past generator, or past owner or operator of a dis-
posal facility. The majority of courts which have addressed
this issue have held that restitution is not available to the
party which cleaned up another's solid or hazardous waste,
but two courts have determined that restitution is an appro-
priate remedy in a citizen's suit.
RCRA § 7002(a) provides that "[t]he district court shall
have jurisdiction,.. . to restrain any person who has contrib-
uted ... to the past ... disposal of any solid or hazardous
waste referred to in paragraph(1)(B), to order such person to
take such other action as may be necessary, or both,.., and to
apply any appropriate civil penalties." 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(1988)(emphasis added). By the plain language of
this section, it is clear that Congress chose to invoke the full
equitable power of the district court to fashion any remedy it
deems appropriate and fair.
In Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946), the
Supreme Court interpreted the Emergency Price Control Act
which provided for injunctive relief, but did not specifically
authorize the district court to award restitution. The Court
determined that the "or other order" language of the Act con-
templated "a remedy other than that of an injunction, . . . a
remedy entered in the exercise of the District Court's equita-
ble jurisdiction." Id. at 399. The Court found that "the com-
prehensiveness of th[e] equitable jurisdiction is not to be
denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legisla-
tive command." Id. at 398. It continued that "[u]nless a stat-
ute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable
inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the full
scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied." Id.
The Court then recognized that "[r]estitution ... lies within
that equitable jurisdiction." Id. at 402. See also United
States v. Long, 537 F.2d 1151, 1153 (1975); United States v.
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Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 201 (D.C.Mo.
1985).
Similar to the Emergency Price Control Act, the citizen
suit provision of RCRA allows the district court to award in-
junctive relief or order other action as may be necessary, and
thus invokes the full scope of a district court's equitable juris-
diction. This is evident from cases finding recovery of costs
incurred pursuant to RCRA activities to possibly be an appro-
priate form of relief under the comparable government suit
provision, RCRA § 7003, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1988).
Chemical Conservation Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (D.C. Mo. 1985);
United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204 (3rd Cir. 1982). Because
sections 7002 and 7003 are worded almost identically, and for
reasons discussed infra, the two sections are to be interpreted
exactly the same way for a citizen as they would be for the
Administrator of the EPA (Administrator). In Price, in inter-
preting § 7003, the court stated that "[a] court of equity has
traditionally had the power to fashion any remedy deemed
necessary and appropriate to do justice in the particular
case," and that "by enacting the endangerment provisions of
RCRA. . . , Congress sought to invoke the broad and flexible
equity powers of the federal courts." Price, 688 F.2d at 211.
The Chemical Conservation court found that § 7003 invoked
.. "the full equity powers of the federal courts in the effort to
protect the public health [and] the environment ... from the
pernicious effects of toxic wastes." Chemical Conservation,
619 F. Supp. at 201, quoting Price, 688 F.2d at 214. Conse-
quently, the courts in both Price and Chemical Conservation
correctly recognized that the plain meaning of the "such other
action as may be necessary" language of § 7003, mirrored in
§ 7002, invoked the full equitable powers of the court, just as
the Supreme Court had in interpreting the "or other order"
language of the Emergency Price Control Act.
In the present case, as in Porter, there is neither clear
legislative command nor statutory language which denied or
restricted the district court's equitable power to award
BRANU restitution for the costs it incurred in cleaning up
NURD's roof acid waste. The only legislative command relat-
ing to the awarding of equitable relief under RCRA is that, as
8631996]
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with any equitable remedy, the courts should consider all the
circumstances of the case and be cognizant of, and explore,
the availability of alternative remedies. S. Rep. No. 284, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 57, 59. This congressional command was re-
peated in both the citizen and government suit provisions of
RCRA. Id. Furthermore, even though the Senate Committee
believed that the courts should consider alternatives, it made
clear that neither citizens nor the government need "exhaust
or rely upon other resources or remedies before seeking re-
lief' under the amendments to §§ 7002 & 7003. Id. The legis-
lative history therefore neither bars nor limits the district
court's full range of equitable powers to allow a citizen plain-
tiff restitution.
The interest at stake in the present case is a public one,
namely the elimination of wastes harmful to health or the en-
vironment, and thus the district court's "equitable powers as-
sume an even broader and more flexible character than when
only a private controversy is at stake." Porter, 328 U.S. at
398. It may be argued that the interest here is in fact private
because BRANU's suit and requested relief, namely mone-
tary restitution, benefits only itself. The monetary restitu-
tion BRANU requests will benefit BRANU, but only by
restoring them to the position they would have been in had
NURD not dumped its roof acid. On the other hand, not re-
quiring NURD to compensate BRANU for its clean up costs
would give NURD a windfall. There would be little incentive
for persons to dispose of their wastes properly if there is no
consequence to noncompliance. Thus, "[fluture compliance
may be more definitely assured if one is compelled to restore
one's illegal gains." Warner, 328 U.S. at 400. Furthermore,
the court in Acme Printing Ink Co. v. Menard, Inc., 812 F.
Supp. 1498 (E.D.Wis. 1992), made it clear that suits brought
for one's own benefit rather than for another's are not barred
by the statute. The Menard court did not find any "policy or
language within § 6972 which prevent[ed] a party from seek-
ing remedies which are to its benefit as well as to the benefit
of others." Id. at 1510. BRANU is a for-profit corporation,
but its business concentrates on rehabilitating industrial
sites in order to reuse valuable land. In this case, BRANU's
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efforts provided a new home for a family, a home which would
not exist but for BRANU's efforts. Therefore, the benefit of
BRANU's efforts protect both human health and the
environment.
Turning to RCRA case law, a recent case which allowed
plaintiffs recovery for clean up costs is KFC Western, Inc. v.
Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 1995). In that case, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit correctly recognized that
Congress intended restitution to be awarded for remediation
costs and therefore allowed the plaintiffs to bring a restitu-
tion suit. The court based its conclusion on the similarity be-
tween the relief provisions of RCRA § 7002(a) and § 7003,
case law, and public policy. The statutory similarity analysis
in KFC Western revolved around the fact that several courts
have allowed the government, through the Administrator, to
obtain restitution costs incurred for diagnostic surveys,
abatement costs, or contaminated site remediation. United
States v. Aceto Agric. Chemicals Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204 (3rd Cir.
1982); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986). The relief provisions
of the statutes are identical, and authorize the district court
"to restrain[,] ... to order such person to take such other ac-
tion as may be necessary, or both." 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972(a),
6973(a) (1988). The KFC Western court determined that be-
cause the statutes as a whole were worded "almost identi-
cally," it would interpret them similarly.
Bolstering the court's determination is the fact that Con-
gress specifically addressed this language similarity issue.
The House commented that the right to sue under the citizen
suit provision was to be construed "pursuant to the standards
of liability established under 7003." H.R. Rep. No. 189, 98th
Cong., 2nd Sess. at 53 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5576. In addition, the Senate was emphatic that "[any dif-
ferences is language between these amendments and section
7003 [were] not intended to reflect a difference in such claims
[for relief]." S. Rep. No. 284, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. at 57
(1983). It is therefore not arguable that the similar wording
of sections 7002 and 7003 need not require similar construc-
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tion; the legislative history of § 7002 makes it abundantly
clear that Congress intended that the sections not only be in-
terpreted similarly, but exactly the same.
It has been argued that Congress intended that only the
liability provisions of sections 7002 and 7003 should be inter-
preted the same way, that is, a citizen only has the same
right to sue as the Administrator does, not the same available
relief. Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 1995). This
argument, however, flies in the face of unambiguous legisla-
tive intent that the 1984 Amendments to the Solid Waste Act
would "allow citizens exactly the same broad substantive and
procedural claim for relief which is already available to the
United States under section 7003." S. Rep. No. 284, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. at 57 (1983). The Senate specifically ad-
dressed the claim for relief, not just the standards of liability.
Because courts have allowed the government, to recover costs
incurred in addressing imminent and substantial endanger-
ment, the legislative history of RCRA § 7002, which specifies
that the two sections should be interpreted the same way,
mandates the same relief be available to citizens.
The KFC Western court recognized that "[i]t would be un-
fair and poor public policy to interpret § [7002](a)(1)(B) as
barring restitution actions." KFC Western, 49 F.3d at 523.
The basis for this recognition was that innocent citizens who
have a financial interest in contaminated property are the
very ones who must comply with the government order to
clean up the property. Thus, as in the instant case, citizens
who unknowingly buy contaminated property must expend
thousands of dollars to clean up the contamination which
they had no part in causing or creating. To bar restitution
would serve as an incentive for businesses to continue dump-
ing their hazardous wastes because they would face no conse-
quences for their actions. And as the KFC Western court
noted, a citizen who is ordered to clean up the property sim-
ply does not have the time to initiate suit against the party
who caused the contamination, especially if that party is no-
where to be found. Id.
Bayless Investment And Trading Co. v. Chevron U.S.A.
Inc., 39 Env't Rep.-Cases 1429 (D.C.Ariz. 1994), mirrors this
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sentiment against prohibiting the award of restitution. The
court relied on its belief that the congressional intent in
amending § 7002 was to invigorate citizen litigation such
that barring restitution would be contrary to the result de-
sired by Congress. Id. at 1432 (quoting Ascon Properties, Inc.
v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1158 (9th Cir. 1989)).
Although the Bayless Investment court did not award restitu-
tion to the plaintiff in that case because it was requested in a
motion for summary judgment, the court did determine that
"this remedy is also obtainable pursuant to RCRA
§ 7002(a)(1)(B)." Bayless Investment, 39 Env't Rep.-Cases at
142. The court feared that to find otherwise would create an
incentive for future plaintiffs "to wait until the conclusion of a
lawsuit before spending money to commence remediation."
Id. The Bayless Investment court circumvented a result di-
rectly contrary to RCRA's national policy which is to elimi-
nate the generation of hazardous wastes "as expeditiously as
possible;" the court also wanted to achieve one of RCRA's
objectives, "to promote the protection of health and the envi-
ronment " 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (1988).
Because both the KFC Western and Bayless Investment
court opinions are based in part on cases allowing recovery of
costs incurred by the government pursuant to § 7003, a brief
discussion of the case which first so found may be helpful to
better understand the argument for the availability of resti-
tution in citizens suits.
Prior to the 1984 Amendments to the Hazardous and
Solid Waste Act, the court in United States v. Price, 688 F.2d
204 (3rd Cir. 1982), determined that § 7003 invoked the
broad equitable powers of a court of equity, and thus the re-
quest for funds for the diagnostic study of the contaminated
site was appropriate. Id. at 212-213. Although the court con-
cluded that the district court did not err in denying prelimi-
nary injunctive relief, it concluded that "prompt preventive
action was the most important consideration" and thereafter
reimbursement could "be directed against parties ultimately
found to be liable." Id. at 214. The importance and correct-
ness of this case is highlighted by the fact that the Senate
approvingly cited it for the proposition that RCRA § 7003 is
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indeed "intended to confer upon the courts the authority to
grant affirmative equitable relief to the extent necessary to
eliminate any risks posed by toxic wastes." S. Rep. No. 284,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. at 59 (1983) quoting United States v.
Price, 688 F.2d 204, 213-214 (3rd Cir. 1982). The fact that
the Senate not only cited Price, but cited it specifically at the
pages discussing availability of restitution shows that the
legislature was aware and approved of this possible remedy
pursuant to § 7003.
Subsequent to the 1984 amendments, several cases have
followed Price and the legislative intent in finding restitution
to be appropriate pursuant to § 7003. See United States v.
Aceto Agric. Chemicals Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989)
(recognizing that § 7003 does not require the EPA to file and
prosecute its action while the endangerment exists and that
it would be an absurd and unnecessary requirement to do so);
United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp 162
(D.Mo. 1985) (concluding that recovery of costs incurred by
the United states pursuant to its activities under RCRA may
be an appropriate form of relief); United States v. Northeast-
ern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 727 (8th Cir.
1985) (concluding that on remand, district court, as a matter
of equitable discretion, could grant the government recovery
of abatement costs incurred); United States v. Vertec Chem.
Corp., 671 F. Supp. 595 (E.D.Ark. 1987) (finding equitable
right of government to seek reimbursement costs incurred in
response to conditions of imminent and substantial
endangerment).
It is abundantly evident from the previous discussion of
the case law, legislative history and plain language of RCRA
§ 7002 as amended in 1984, the district court erred in refus-
ing BRANU restitution for the costs it incurred while clean-
ing up the contamination NURD created by dumping a listed
hazardous waste into the ground.
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E. The case law which supports NURD's argument that
RCRA § 7002 does not allow restitution for private
citizens is not applicable to the present case.
The district court in the present case was incorrect in re-
fusing to award BRANU restitution, although it was follow-
ing the lead of the majority of cases which have addressed the
issue of availability of restitution for citizens suits. These
cases, however, are not applicable to the instant case in that
they are distinguishable from the present case, have been an-
alyzed incorrectly, or have wrongly followed other cases.
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Lamphier, 714
F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1983), the court determined that according
to RCRA § 7002(a), the citizen plaintiffs could obtain injunc-
tive relief because they were "acting as private attorneys gen-
eral rather than pursuing a private remedy" of damages. Id.
at 337. This language has been extensively quoted as prohib-
iting the awarding of restitution to citizens pursuant to
RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B). Acting as a "private attorney general"
has been taken to mean that the plaintiff could not receive
any monetary relief because that would be inconsistent with
the term. Even a government attorney general, however, is
funded through some source. He does not expend his own
pocket money without expectation of reimbursement by the
government. More importantly, Lamphier was decided prior
to the 1984 Amendments to the Hazardous and Solid Waste
Act, and thus is not applicable to the present case.
Although the Lamphier court distinguished Middlesex
County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Associ-
ation, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), which interpreted the citizen suit
provision of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA), 35 U.S.C. § 1365(a), its discussion of that case is
relevant because it has been relied upon many times by other
courts to prohibit restitution under RCRA § 7002.
In Middlesex, the Supreme Court, by considering the
plain language and legislative history of FWPCA § 1365(a),
held that it specifically provided for injunctive relief, and
therefore the statute did not authorize an implied private
right of action for damages. Id. at 13-18. The court in Walls
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v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 316 (6th Cir. 1985),
interpreted this holding to prohibit a private action for dam-
ages under RCRA 7002(a)(1)(B). As discussed below, because
of the rationale of the Supreme Court in Middlesex, and the
differences in language between FWPCA 505(a) and RCRA
7002(a)(1)(B), it is evident that the Walls court erred in its
interpretation of Middlesex.
Looking at the statutory language of FWPCA § 505(a),
which stated that the citizen's remedy is "to enforce such an
effluent standard or limitation, or such order," the Court de-
termined that it authorized only injunction, and no additional
implied judicial remedies. Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 13-14.
Turning to the legislative history, the Court found nothing to
support a contrary conclusion, instead found there was spe-
cific language supporting the fact that FWPCA was intended
to be limited to injunctive relief. Id. at 17-18 (quoting 116
Cong. Rec. at 33,102 "bill is limited to seeking abatement...
and expressly excludes damage actions").
Conversely, RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B) does expressly provide
for other judicial relief because it not only authorizes the dis-
trict court "to restrain" but also "to order other such action as
may be necessary, or both." 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1988). The
plain language contemplates both injunctive relief and other
judicial orders. As for legislative history, although the House
report states that the citizen suit provision "confers... a lim-
ited right .. .to sue to abate an imminent and substantial
endangerment," that right is pursuant to the standards of lia-
bility" of RCRA 7003, which allows the government to obtain
restitution damages. H.R. Rep. No. 189, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 1 at 53. Moreover, the Senate committee states that
§ 7002 "authorize[s] citizens to seek relief, including abate-
ment" which contemplates remedies other than injunction
are available. S. Rep. No. 284, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. at 55.
The limitations to the citizen suit recognized by both the
House and the Senate are not aimed towards limiting relief
available, but towards assuring that the right of the Adminis-
trator to sue is not restricted. H.R. Rep. No. 189, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 1 at 53; S. Rep. No. 284, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. at
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56. Because the Administrator did not initiate action1 in the
instant case, BRANU is not limited in its right to sue or ob-
tain an appropriate remedy.
Consequently, the plain language as well as the legisla-
tive history of RCRA § 7002 clearly contemplates restitution
as an appropriate equitable remedy to be awarded by the dis-
trict court. The Supreme Court's interpretation of FWPCA
§ 505(a) has no applicability to RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B). As
Walls incorrectly interpreted Middlesex to prohibit the dis-
trict court from granting such relief, its decision does not bar
BRANU's request for restitution.
Commerce Holding Co. v. Buckstone, 749 F. Supp 441
(E.D.N.Y. 1990), also denied recovery for costs of remediation
basing its decision on Lamphier, Walls, and Middlesex, which
as discussed above, are inapplicable to the present case.
Commerce Holding, 749 F. Supp. at 445. Furthermore, the
Commerce Holding court mistakenly suggests that a citizen
plaintiff may not be awarded relief under § 7002 if he "would
be the direct beneficiary of the substantive relief." Commerce
Holding, 749 F. Supp. at 445. This suggestion is incorrect as
courts have determined that "there is 'no language in [42
U.S.C.] § 6972 which prevents a party from seeking remedies
which are to its benefit as well as to the benefit of others.'"
Bayless Investment, 39 Env't Rep.-Cases at 1434 (quoting
Acme Printing, 812 F.Supp 1498, 1510 (E.D.Wis. 1992). Com-
merce Holding provides no bar to BRANU's claim for
restitution.
The decisions in Gache v. City of Harrison, N.Y, 812
F.Supp. 1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (relying on Commerce Holding
and Lamphier, making no analysis of its own, to grant sum-
mary judgment against the plaintiff on its claim for costs of
remediation); Kaufman And Broad-South Bay v. Unisys
Corp., 822 F.Supp. 1468 (N.D.Cal. 1993) (following Walls and
Commerce Holding to deny the plaintiff restitution), and
Prisco v. New York, 1995 WL 548322 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (follow-
1. Whether the Administrator has "commenced and is diligently prosecut-
ing" an action is a case-by-case determination, but for purposes of the citizen
suit, this language means that the Administrator has actually filed suit or is-
sued an administrative order.
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ing Gache to deny plaintiffs restitution), are also inapposite
to BRANU's claim for remediation costs as they too rely on
inapplicable cases.
Fallowfield Dev. Corp. v. Strunk, 1993 WL 157723
(E.D.Pa. 1993) (following Commerce Holding), and Ports-
mouth Redev. and Hous. Auth. v. BMI Apts. Assoc., 847
F.Supp. 380 (E.D.Va. 1994) (following Commerce Holding,
Lamphier, Walls, and Kaufman) not only relied inapplicable
decisions, but relied on an entirely incorrect premise in deny-
ing the plaintiffs restitution. Both Fallowfield and Ports-
mouth presumed that because CERCLA expressly provides
for remedial and response costs, there is no such relief avail-
able under RCRA. Fallowfield at 15; Portsmouth at 385. The
legislative history of RCRA § 7002, however, clearly states
that "U[j]ust as the United States need not utilize its resources
available to it under section 104 of the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
... or similar authorities, citizens need not exhaust or rely
upon other resources or remedies, before seeking relief under
these [1984] amendments." S. Rep. No. 284, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. at 57. Thus, the exhaustion of remedy premise relied on
in Fallowfield and Portsmouth directly contradicts unambig-
uous legislative language. As both cases followed wrongly de-
cided case law and the exhaustion of remedy premise, neither
case is considered to prohibit BRANU from recovering the $
200,000 it spent on remediating NURD's former site.
Perhaps the most important case to distinguish is Furrer
v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 1995) because it is from the
same circuit court which decided Aceto. In Furrer, the court
refused to allow plaintiffs any restitution by refuting KFC
Western and finding that Aceto was inapplicable because the
question of recovering costs was never before the court. The
Furrer court criticized the KFC Western court for basing its
decision on "an arguably faulty premise," and then miscon-
struing "two Eighth Circuit opinions involving governmental
plaintiffs" to arrive at its holding. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1100.
The Furrer decision, however, is the one whose analysis is
flawed. Contrary to the Furrer court's criticism, the KFC
Western premise-that the legislative history of 7002 and
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7003 suggests the two sections are intended to parallel one
another-is not only correct, but required by the legislative
intent as discussed above. Furthermore, the Furrer court
suggests that the legislative history of the two sections meant
only the standards of liability to be similar, not the relief
available. Reading the Senate report on this issue requires
the opposite conclusion, that the parallel between the sec-
tions extends to the substantive relief available.
As to the misconstruction of the Eighth Circuit cases, the
Furrer court is incorrect. In KFC Western, the court stated
that the Eighth Circuit "recognized the Administrator's right
to sue under [7002] for restitution of costs incurred," which it
did by stating that the "'imminent and substantial endanger-
ment' language does not require the EPA to file and prosecute
its RCRA action while the endangerment exists." KFC West-
ern, 49 F.3d at 522; Aceto, 872 F.2d at 383. Simply because
the Eighth Circuit failed to raise the subject matter jurisdic-
tion issue but assumed it does not make the Ninth Circuit's
reliance on the decision a misconstruction of the opinion. Be-
cause the Eighth Circuit opinion serves only as persuasive
authority, and is of no precedential value, for the sister cir-
cuits, whether dicta or holding is relied upon is of little conse-
quence. Of course, the Eighth Circuit has no obligation to
follow the decision of its sister court, but it is incorrect in la-
belling the Ninth Circuit's opinion a misconstruction of the
Ninth Circuit's opinions. Whatever meritorious analysis the
Furrer court made, the court was incorrect in following the
cases distinguished above. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1101. For the
foregoing reasons, Furrer does not present a bar to BRANU's
recovery of costs it incurred in cleaning up NURD's contami-
nation of the site.
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ARGUMENT H
II. NURD IS LIABLE UNDER CERCLA § 107 FOR
NURD'S DISPOSAL OF ROOF ACID WHICH,
BECAUSE IT IS A LISTED HAZARDOUS
WASTE UNDER RCRA, IS ALSO A
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE UNDER CERCLA
§ 101(14).
BRANU has established that the roof acid and fruit juice
mixture which NURD disposed at its cite in Moll's Gardens
between 1981 and 1983 was a hazardous substance for CER-
CLA purposes. Roof acid, a listed hazardous waste, may not
escape RCRA management simply by being mixed with a
nonhazardous waste without first completing the delisting
procedure. Furthermore, under RCRA regulations, mixtures
of listed hazardous wastes and solid wastes retain their haz-
ardous waste status no matter how low the concentration of
the hazardous waste in the mixture. Therefore, because haz-
ardous substances under CERCLA include listed hazardous
wastes under RCRA, roof acid mixed with fruit juice is a haz-
ardous substance under CERCLA. Accordingly, BRANU has
established NURD's liability for response costs pursuant to
CERCLA § 107, and the district court's order must be
reversed.
A. NURD may not evade liability for its wrongful disposal
of a listed waste by asserting that it can delist its
waste by simply mixing it with fruit juice without
going through a formal exclusion procedure with
the EPA
Once NURD's roof acid satisfied the criteria for identifi-
cation as a listed hazardous waste, it remained a hazardous
waste despite later being mixed with nonhazardous material.
Although a waste must be pure or technical grade to be listed
as a hazardous waste, there is no requirement that it main-
tain its technical grade. To the contrary, the continuing ju-
risdiction principle provides that a properly identified listed
hazardous waste may only exit subchapter c requirements
upon a formal exclusion ruling by the EPA. Furthermore, a
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listed waste "contained-in" a non-solid waste medium re-
mains a hazardous waste while in this diluted form. There-
fore, because NURD's roof acid me[ It the listing description
set forth in subpart D," and never was delisted, it remained a
hazardous waste.
1. NURD's technical grade roof acid, which was
stored before disposal, satisfied the
prerequisites for identification as a listed
waste under §261.3(a) (2)(ii).
Before a material may proceed into the RCRA manage-
ment system as a listed waste, the material must: (1) be a
solid waste, and (2) meet the listing description set forth in
subpart d. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)(2)(ii). NURD's roof acid satis-
fied both the prerequisites for listing as a hazardous waste,
and thus, was subject to RCRA requirements.
No material can be a hazardous waste without first being
a solid waste. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a) (1995); Hazardous Waste
Management System: Identification and Listing of Hazard-
ous Waste, 45 Fed. Reg. 33084, 33090 (1980) (preamble to the
final rule to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 261.2). The regulatory
solid waste framework is predicated on the premise that "a
solid waste is any discarded material." 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.2(a)(1) (1995). The EPA expounded on the definition of
discarded material to include "material which is abandoned
by disposal." 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.2(a)(2), (b)(1)-(2) (1995).
By placing its excess roof acid in a compost pit, NURD
obviously disposed of the roof acid consistent with the regula-
tory definition of disposal. 40 C.F.R. § 260.10(2) (1995) "Dis-
posal means the.., deposit,.., dumping.., or placing of any
[material] into or on any land or water so that such solid
waste . . . may enter the environment." Id. However, aban-
donment of a material also occurs when a waste is stored or
accumulated before disposal. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(b)(3). There-
fore, the roof acid became a solid waste when NURD finished
using it for its intended purpose as a delaminator, and col-
lected it for transportation to its Moll's Gardens property,
where it would be disposed. Id.
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A solid waste "becomes a [listed] hazardous waste ...
when the waste first meets the description set forth in sub-
part d." 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(b)(1) (1995)(subpart d lists the in-
dividual solid wastes which are subject to individual listings).
Roof acid is included as a listed hazardous waste. (R. 2).
Under most circumstances, a waste conforms to its listing de-
scription when it is pure or technical grade. 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.33 (1995); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 38
F.3d 862, 869-70 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Recticel
Foam Corp., 858 F. Supp. 726, 731, 735 (E.D. Tenn. 1993).
But cf. 40 C.F.R. § 261.31(a) (1995)(providing that the F001
to F005 descriptions apply to mixtures and blends of these
wastes). NURD's roof acid powder, as mixed with water, was
a technical grade hazardous waste listed under subpart d.
(R. 2, 3). That NURD eventually mixed the roof acid with
fruit juice does not matter, since the roof acid already satis-
fied both hazardous waste criteria.
2. According to the continuing jurisdiction
principle, a properly identified listed waste
may only be delisted under the authority
of the EPA.
After NURD's roof acid entered the subtitle C hazardous
waste management system as a listed hazardous waste, it
continued to be hazardous, notwithstanding subsequent mix-
ture with another solid waste. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(c)(1)
(1995)(continuing jurisdiction principle). The continuing ju-
risdiction principle is an essential component of the regula-
tory scheme the EPA developed under RCRA which "directs
the EPA to establish a comprehensive 'cradle to grave' system
regulating the generation, transport, storage, treatment and
disposal of hazardous wastes." Chemical Waste Management,
Inc v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992); 45 Fed. Reg. at 33085
(1980)(preamble to final rules); To effectuate the full scope of
their authority, the EPA provided that (1) a listed "hazardous
waste will remain a hazardous waste" until delisted; and (2)
the delisting procedure was the exclusive procedure for ex-
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cluding a listed waste from the RCRA regulatory system.
§ 261.3(c)(1).2
While the delisting procedure "has been criticized for its
slowness, difficulty, and expense," Jeffrey M. Gaba, The Mix-
ture and Derived-From Rules Under RCRA: Once a Hazard-
ous Waste Always a Hazardous Waste?, 21 Envtl. L. Rep.
10033 (1991); see also Hazardous Waste Management Sys-
tem: Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste, 45 Fed.
Reg. 33095 (1980)(final rules for 40 C.F.R. part 261); Lori
Caramanian, Hazardous Waste Management After Shell Oil,
11 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 265, n33 (1993), EPA is justified for
retaining sole authority for excluding low concentration
wastes from the lists in subpart D. James E. Satterfield,
EPA's Continuing Jurisdiction Regulation: A Response to
The Mixture Rule and the Environmental Code, 25 Envtl. L.
Rep. 10262, 10263 (1995). In contrast to characteristic waste
which are capable of being reasonably measured or detected,
40 C.F.R. § 261.10(a)(2), there are no such procedures readily
available for detecting and measuring the hazardous attrib-
utes of a listed waste. Hazardous Waste Management Sys-
tem: Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste, 45 Fed.
Reg. 33084, 33105 (1980). Hence, the EPA could not entrust
generators and disposers with the authority to make the de-
termination that a listed waste no longer poses a danger to
health and environment. Id.
Furthermore, The Recticel Foam Corp. decision does not
preclude application of the continuing jurisdiction principle
in the case sub judice. 858 F. Supp. 726. In Recticel Foam
Corp., Judge Murrian held that he could not apply continuing
jurisdiction to the listed waste because there never was origi-
nal jurisdiction. 858 F. Supp. at 736-39; see also Bethlehem
Steel, 38 F.3d 862, 871 (7th Cir. 1994)(misinterpreting the
2. While § 261.3(c)(1) has been subject to some judicial review, the contin-
uing jurisdiction principle has never been fully addressed. Steel Mfrs. Ass'n v.
EPA, 27 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 869
F.2d 1539 (D.C. Cir. 1989)(finding that 261.3(c)(1) supported the contained-in
rule, a corollary to continuing jurisdiction); United States v. Recticel Foam
Corp., 858 F. Supp. 726, 737 (E.D. Tenn. 1993)(examining continuing jurisdic-
tion but holding it inapplicable to the facts of that case).
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continuing jurisdiction principle by applying the contained in
rule instead). The listed waste in that case was first used "to
purge the mixing head of remaining foam ingredients" and
then drained into a box or barrel under the foaming unit
where it was combined with nonhazardous waste streams
and stored before disposal. Recticel Foam, 858 F. Supp. at
729. According to these facts, the listed material became a
solid waste when it was stored in the barrel with other waste
streams. § 261.2(b)(3). However, this solid waste amalgama-
tion could not satisfy the criteria for becoming a listed waste
because it was not pure or technical grade. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 38 F.3d at 869-70. Therefore, as the solid waste could
not "meet the listing description set forth in subpart d,"
§ 261.3(b)(1), and the mixture rule could not be applied be-
cause it was vacated, Shell Oil Co., 950 F.2d 741, 752
(D.C.Cir. 1991), the solid waste evaded identification as a
hazardous waste and the ramifications of the continuing ju-
risdiction principle. Recticel Foam Corp., 858 F. Supp. at
729, 736-39.
Conversely, Judge Remus did have original jurisdiction
to apply to NURD's roof acid mixture. When NURD finished
a particular job with excess roof acid, it collected the roof acid
for transport back to Moll's Gardens and disposal. (R. 2) Be-
cause this would constitute an accumulation and storage
before disposal, § 261.2(b)(3), NURD's roof acid was an un-
mixed, technical grade listed waste which continuing juris-
diction could attach. §§ 261.3(a)(2)(ii), (b)(1), (c)(1).
Therefore, When NURD later mixed the roof acid with fruit
juice it had no effect on the roof acid's previous identification,
and the roof acid remained a hazardous waste. (R. 2)
Moreover, the continuing jurisdiction principle would not
render the mixture rule nugatory. The mixture rule provides
that a mixture of solid waste and one or more hazardous
wastes is a hazardous waste. § 261.3(a)(2)(iv). NURD as-
serts that if a listed waste remains a hazardous waste after
commingling it with non hazardous wastes, then there would
have been no major loophole to close under the 1978 proposed
rules and the mixture rule would have been unnecessary.
Hazardous Waste Management System: Identification and
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Listing of Hazardous Waste, 45 Fed. Reg. at 33095
(1980)(preamble to part 261 final rules). As demonstrated by
Recticel Foam Corp., however, there still was a major loop-
hole to close under the hazardous waste listing provisions
even with a continuing jurisdiction principle. A material
which is mixed before becoming a solid waste cannot be iden-
tified as a listed hazardous waste because it never was pure
or technical grade. § 261.3(a). Therefore, because there was
never original jurisdiction for continuing jurisdiction to at-
tach, the mixture rule would still play an essential role in the
hazardous waste identification procedures.
3. Because fruit juice cannot properly be
considered a solid waste, its mixture with
roof acid is subject to the contained-in
rule.
The contained-in rule applies to mixtures of hazardous
wastes and nonsolid wastes, which would ordinarily evade
hazardous waste identification. First, such a mixture could
not meet the description set forth in subpart D, because it
would be impure or nontechnical grade. Recticel Foam Corp.,
858 F. Supp. at 731, 735. Second, the mixture rule would be
inapplicable because it can only be applied to mixtures of
listed wastes and solid wastes. § 261.3(a)(2)(iv). Because
fruit juice should be considered a nonsolid waste, the con-
tained-in rule will prevent NURD's roof acid and fruit juice
mixture from evading RCRA regulations.
As adopted in Chemical Waste Management, the con-
tained-in rule provides that a "hazardous waste cannot be
presumed to change character when it is combined with an
environmental medium, and the hazardous waste restric-
tions therefore continue to apply to waste which is contained
in soil or ground water." 869 F.2d -, 1539 (D.C.Cir. 1989).
An environmental medium is not a solid waste because it can-
not be properly considered abandoned. Chemical Waste Man-
agement, 869 F.2d at 538-40.
While the contained-in rule was originally applied to
groundwater, the contained-in rule has been expanded to
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cover water in general. United States v. Johnson, 886 F.
Supp. 1067 (W.D.N.Y. 1995).
Water is not a "solid waste" for purposes of the regulations
implementing RCRA, since its definition does not encom-
pass a non-hazardous substance like water, nor does it fall
within the terms of the applicable regulations. Conse-
quently, a "mixture" of a listed hazardous waste-spent
solvents-and water is not a hazardous waste under the
regulations' so-called "mixture" rule. Rather the substance
is a listed waste in an altered form.
Id. at 1067 (adopting a contained-in policy). Fruit juice
should also be included in this expanded environmental me-
dia definition because it is primarily water.
Furthermore, the fruit juice was never abandoned, and
therefore cannot be considered a solid waste. NURD com-
posted the fruit juice, presumably to use the resulting mate-
rial as fertilizer. (R. 2) Because NURD would gain a benefit
from this material, it was not abandoning it according to the
requirements of the solid waste definition. § 261.2(b)(1)
Moreover, Congress did not intend fertilizers which did not
exhibit hazardous attributes to be considered a discarded ma-
terial. H.R. Rep. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1976) re-
printed in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238. But See 45 Fed. Reg.
33084, 33091 (1980)(positing that "chemical-bearing sludges
used as fertilizers" may regulated). Therefore, fertilizer
should be considered an environmental medium similar to
the earth it is intended to augment. While NURD also
thought that the roof acid "would enhance the soil" (R. 2), roof
acid actually poses a danger to the environment and cannot
be considered fertilizer. § 261.3 (a)(2)(ii). Furthermore, be-
cause suits pursuant to CERCLA § 107(a) are strict liability,
mistake is not a defense. See Northeastern Pharmaceutical
Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726 at 743 (8th Cir. 1987).
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B. The repromulgated mixture rule, which is incorporated
into CERCLA through § 101(14) for the purposes of
suits pursuant to CERCLA § 107(a), may be
applied to disposals which occurred before 1992,
because § 107(a) is retroactive
Liability may also be imposed under the mixture rule
notwithstanding its recent invalidation. Shell Oil Co. v. EPA,
950 F.2d 741, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Although the vacatur of
the mixture rule in Shell Oil is indisputable, the validity of
RCRA regulations may only be challenged in the D.C. Court
of Appeals. 42 U.S.C. § 6976(a)(1). Because the mixture rule
was repromulgated, it may be applied in the instant case.
Hazardous Waste Management System; Definition of Haz-
ardous Waste; "Mixture" and "Derived-From" Rules, 57 Fed.
Reg. 7628 (1992) (repromulgating an interim final mixture
rule). Furthermore, liability may be imposed upon NURD
under CERCLA § 107 despite the fact that this would entail a
retroactive application of § 107.
A statute operates retroactively if it imposes "new legal
consequences to events completed before it enactment." Lan-
grafv. USI Film Products, - U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 128 L.
Ed. 229 (1994). CERCLA § 107(a) imposes liability on per-
sons who owned property at the time hazardous substances
were disposed on it. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Therefore, because
CERCLA § 107 applies to past owners of land, one interpreta-
tion of this provision would be that it imposes liability to pre-
enactment activity. A legislative enactment may be applied
retroactively if Congress expressly conveys such an intent.
§ 107(a)(2). Furthermore, retroactive legislation, criminal
prosecutions aside, does not encroach on due process if the
retroactive "liability scheme is rationally related to a valid
legislative purpose." United States v Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d
160, 173 (4th Cir. 1988).
The majority of courts examining retroactivity have held
that Congress intended CERCLA § 107 to be applied to pre-
enactment disposals. E.g. United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Shell Oil Co., 841 F. Supp. 962 (D. Cal.
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1993). Congressional intent on whether the statute should be
applied retroactively is shown primarily in statutory lan-
guage. Langraf, - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. at 1500, 128 L. Ed. at;
United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (D.
Colo. 1985); Ohio v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1309 (N.D.
Ohio 1983). The relevant language provides that "any person
who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous sub-
stances were disposed of ... shall be liable for ... any...
necessary costs of response incurred by any.., person consis-
tent with the national contingency plan." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(2), (a)(4)(B). Because the actus reus of CERCLA
§ 107(a)(1) is expressed in the past tense-owned, operated,
disposed, incurred-a retrospective application is evident in
the plain language. C.f Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810
F.2d at 735; Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp at 1073; Georgeoff, 562
F. Supp. at 1310 (holding that the use of accepts or accepted
in the alternative did not evince a congressional intent to reg-
ulate pre- and post-enactment conduct). Furthermore, a ret-
roactive liability scheme is necessary to give the CERCLA
§ 107(a)(2) effect. Because present owners of waste sites are
already subject to liability under CERCLA § 107(a)(1), a non-
retroactive application of CERCLA § 107(a)(2) would render
this subsection nugatory.
NURD incorrectly argues that "shall" shows an ambigu-
ity in Congress' intent to retroactively apply this statute.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 735; Shell Oil Co.,
605 F. Supp. at 1073. "Shall" does not apply to the actus reus
or conduct of the actor, but provides a court the power to im-
pose mandatory liability. Although liability may be incurred
by an actor for past actions, it is impossible for a court to ac-
tually impose the liability at any time except in the present.
Therefore, "shall" does not detract from the patent retrospec-
tive congressional intent of CERCLA § 107.
This construction of Subsection (a) is supported by the
legislative history of CERCLA. H.R. Rep. No. 172, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119.
The purpose of CERCLA was to "amend the Solid Waste Dis-
posal Act to provide for a national inventory of inactive haz-
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ardous waste sites and to establish a program for appropriate
environmental response action to protect public health and
the environment from the dangers posed by such sites." Id.
at 1, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6119. The inactive waste cites
which Congress intended to remediate included existing cites
where the disposal occurred before CERCLA was enacted. In
1979, EPA estimated that of the 30,000 to 50,000 inactive
sites then in existence, 1,200-2,000 presented a serious risk
to public health. Complementing this purpose, was Congress'
intent to compel those responsible for the disposal to bear the
cost of the clean up. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp at 1312; see also
Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 734. There was
"an unequivocal Congressional intent to effect the complete
clean up of the existing hazardous waste facilities." George-
off, 562 F. Supp. at 1311-12. Therefore, to give teeth to Con-
gress' intent, CERCLA § 107 must apply retroactively to
disposals which occurred before its enactment.3 CERCLA
§ 107(f) also shows Congress' intent to apply the § 107(a) ret-
roactively. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 736;
Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1075; Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at
1311. Subparagraph (C) § 107(a) imposes liability for injury
to natural resources. Subsection f of § 107 which provides
that "[t]here shall be no recovery under the authority of sub-
paragraph (C) (natural resources section) of subsection (a) of
this section where such damages and the release of a hazard-
ous substance from which such damages result have occurred
wholly before December 11, 1980," evinces two important
points regarding CERCLA 107(a) retroactivity. First, this
shows Congress' intent to allow for recovery for pre-enact-
ment disposals under § 107(a)(4)(C) if the damages did not
occur before 1980. More importantly, by limiting retroactive
application under § 107(a)(4)(C), this section "implicitly au-
thorizes retroactive application of § 107(a)(4)(A)-(B). North-
eastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 736.
3. In fact most courts analyzing this issue have had no trouble imposing
this retroactive liability. Many courts have even allowed recovery for response
courts which occurred before enactment. E.g. Northeastern Pharmaceutical,
810 F.2d at 734.
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The legislative history of CERCLA § 107(f) is also consis-
tent with the retroactive construction of CERCLA. This sec-
tion was originally found in section 4(n) of Senate Bill 1480.
S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1980). Section 4(n)
limited the recovery for certain damages, including damages
to real property, personal property, natural resources, loss of
income, and medical expenses, where both the damages and
the release occurred before enactment of CERCLA. But sub-
section (n) did not limit removal costs for releases which oc-
curred prior to CERCLA's enactment. Furthermore, the
Committee Report stated that "section 4(n) specifies how
claims for certain damages occurring before enactment will
be handled under S. 1480. Costs of removal (cleanup and
containment) are not affected by this provision, nor are any
damages associated with continuing releases." (need cite).
Congress therefore expressed its intent to impose liability for
actions that occurred before CERCLA was enacted. There-
fore, because liability may be imposed for conduct occurring
before CERCLA was enacted, when new substance become
subject to CERCLA § 107(a) liability, it can be done
retroactively.
A retroactive application of CERCLA is rationally related
to its purpose and therefore satisfies due process. Monsanto,
858 F.2d at 173; Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at
734. CERCLA's primary purpose is to clean up inactive dis-
posal sites and impose liability on the party responsible for
the contamination. As discussed supra, environmental pro-
tection is a valid use of Congress' authority under the Com-
merce Clause.
Appellees argument that Goodner Bros. precludes the
retroactive application of the mixture rule to conduct before
its repromulgation is inapposite. 966 F.2d 380 (8th Cir.
1992). Goodner Bros., which vacated the mixture rule retro-
actively, concerned a criminal suit by EPA pursuant to RCRA
section 6928(d)(2)(A). Goodner Bros., 966 F.2d at 383.
The government argued in Goodner that even though the
court in Shell Oil invalidated the mixture rule, the invalida-
tion was only to be given prospective affect. 966 F.2d at 384-
85. The government interpreted Shell this way because the
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/30
MOOT COURT
court proposed to the EPA to repromulgate the rules on an
interim basis under the good cause exemption of the A.P.A to
avoid a "discontinuity in the regulation of hazardous waste."
Shell Oil Co., 950 F.2d at 752.
The court in Goodner refused to accept such an interpre-
tation. While "an unlawfully promulgated regulation can be
left in place while the agency provides the proper procedural
remedy," the Goodner Bros. court held that the Shell Oil
opinion did not overcome the burden that an unlawfully
promulgated regulation has no force or effect of law. 966 F.2d
at 384-85. The court made this interpretation because the
Shell Oil opinion used the word vacate. Id. To vacate a law
is to deprive it of force of law. Id.
Even if the Goodner Bros. court's interpretation of Shell
Oil is correct, it is not applicable to the argument that the
repromulgated mixture rule is retroactive in this case. The
Goodner Bros. court never analyzed whether the reenacted
mixture rule could be retroactively applied. 4 Such an argu-
ment would have been futile because a conviction of a person
under a statute for actions which occurred before the enact-
ment of the statute would be a violation of the rule against ex
post facto prohibitions.
But this is a suit pursuant to CERCLA § 107. CERCLA
§ 107 concerns remediation and clean up of hazardous sub-
stances and does not impose any criminal sanctions. As long
as the roof acid and fruit juice mixture was a hazardous sub-
stance at the time of BRANU's response action in 1993, the
CERCLA § 107 claim is sufficient for Due process concerns.
The last retroactivity issue is whether the mixture rule,
as an agency rule, can be applied retroactively. NURD con-
tends that while Congress' power to enact retroactive stat-
utes is not very limited, an agency's power to promulgate
retroactive rules is proscribed by the A.P.A. See Bowen v. Ge-
orgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 214 (1988)(J.
4. The government argued that vacatur of the original rule should only be
given prospective effect, and that the government could rely on the Arkansas
mixture rule to replace the invalidated federal one. Goodner Bros., 966 F.2d
384-85.
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Scalia concurring). First, the majority did not adopt this
view. Id. at 208 (allowing agencies to promulgate retroac-
tively when Congress expressly permits). Second, even if the
A.P.A. limits an agencies power to promulgate retroactive
rules, the A.P.A. does not limit the mixture rule in this case.
The mixture rule is incorporated into CERCLA as a substan-
tive provision of CERCLA. CERCLA § 101(14), codified at 42
U.S.C. § 9601 (14) (1988) (incorporating RCRA hazardous
wastes into CERCLA), and would not be subject to the limits
placed on agencies.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Brownfields Redevelopment
Associates of New Union respectfully requests this court to:
1) affirm the findings of the district court that Congress was
within its Commerce Clause authority in enacting RCRA, 2)
reverse the findings of the district court that no private cause
of action for restitution was created under RCRA § 7002 and
that NURD is not liable to BRANU under RCRA § 7002, and
3) reverse the findings of the district court that the "roof acid"
mixture was not a hazardous waste at the time of its disposal
and that NURD is not liable to BRANU under CERCLA
§ 107.
Respectfully submitted,
Counsel for the Appellant
40http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/30
